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ESSAY
FALSE CONSENSUS BIAS IN
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Lawrence Solan *
Terri Rosenblatt**
Daniel Osherson***
Psychologists call the propensity to believe that one's views are the predominant views, when in fact they are not, 'false consensus bias." In the
interpretationof contracts,false consensus bias should be of special concern
when a dispute arises over whether an event fits within contractual language. In this Essay, we report experimental studies conducted with laypeople andjudges. Lay individuals, when presented with scenarios relevant to
insurance contracts that have led to inconsistent results among courts, do
not understand contractual languageuniformly. Because they are subject to
false consensus bias, these individuals believe that their interpretation is the
normal interpretation, even when it is not. This holds true whatever the
scenario, whatever the interpretation,and whichever party will be assisted by
one interpretationor the other. Judges presented with the same scenarios also
exhibitedfalse consensus bias. These studies suggest thatjudges should take
seriously the disagreement of otherjudges in determiningwhether contractual
language is subject to multiple interpretations. Otherwise, litigants may become unwilling participants in a lottery whose result is determined by the
idiosyncratic interpretation of the judge assigned to their case. Concern
about the reasonable expectations of the parties should also be taken into
account.
INTRODUCTION

Psychologists call the propensity to believe that one's views are the
predominant views, when in fact they are not, "false consensus bias."' In
this Essay, we report experimental studies that present a problem for the
* Don Forchelli Professor of Law, Director, Center for the Study of Law, Language,
and Cognition, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Brooklyn Law School.
** Associate Attorney, Law Offices of Joel Rudin.
Henry R. Luce Professor of Information Technology, Consciousness, and
Culture, and Professor of Psychology, Princeton University. The authors are grateful to
Tom Baker, Neil Cohen, James Hampton, Greg Murphy, and Jeffrey Stempel for helpful
suggestions. This paper was presented at the Insurance and Society Discussion Group,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 2007, at which many helpful comments were
provided to us. This project was supported in part by a Dean's Summer Research Stipend
from Brooklyn Law School.
1. See Joachim Krueger & Russell W. Clement, The Truly False Consensus Effect: An
Ineradicable and Egocentric Bias in Social Perception, 67 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol.
596, 596-97 (1994) (explaining generally effect of personal attributes and endorsements
on consensus estimates); see also infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
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law of contracts: When individuals are given scenarios that have led to
differences of opinion among the courts, they do not understand contractual language uniformly and, because they are subject to false consensus bias, believe that their interpretation is the normal interpretation,
even when it is not. This is true whatever the scenario, whatever the interpretation, and whichever party will be assisted by one interpretation or
the other. When judges are presented with the same scenarios, they also
exhibit false consensus bias.
These results suggest that the parties to a contract may understand
their rights and obligations differently and never notice the differences
until a disagreement occurs and litigation ensues. At that point, if the
decisionmaker-typically a judge-does not recognize the legitimacy of
both contrary interpretations because of false consensus bias, then she
may fail to engage in additional investigation into the parties' intent or to
apply interpretive principles of contract law that follow from a finding of
ambiguity. The parol evidence rule, for example, permits the admission
of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguity in contractual language, but
prohibits evidence offered to vary the terms of a contract whose language
is clear. 2 Courts vary considerably as to how much investigation to conduct before determining whether contractual language is clear as an initial matter,3 but the general principle-that unambiguous contract terms
may not be refuted by the introduction of extrinsic evidence-is fairly
uniform across jurisdictions, as recognized by the Restatement, 4 the
UCC, 5 and the courts. 6

2. See, e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.3, at 426 (4th ed. 2004) ("[S]ince the
[parol evidence] rule excludes evidence only if it contradicts the writing ... [,] the rule
does not exclude evidence offered to help interpret the language of the writing.").
3. The division is between courts that use a "hard" parol evidence rule that permits
courts to limit their investigation to the language of the contract itself, and those that use a
"soft" parol evidence rule that permits some preliminary inquiry into whether a contract
that looks clear at first glance remains so after some investigation. See generally Eric A.
Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of
Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 533 (1998) (describing and analyzing "hard"
and "soft" parol evidence rule approaches).
4. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213(1) (1981) ("A binding integrated
agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.").
5. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2004) (stating that writings intended as final expressions "may not
be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement").
6. Courts continue to articulate the parol evidence rule in such terms. For recent
examples, see, e.g., Clanton v. Inter.Net Global, L.L.C., 435 F.3d 1319, 1326 (l1th Cir.
2006) ("Under New York law, 'the parol evidence rule requires the exclusion of evidence
of conversations, negotiations and agreements made prior to or contemporaneous with the
execution of a written contract which may tend to vary or contradict its terms."' (footnote
omitted) (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir.
1991))); Staubach Retail Servs.-Se., LLC v. H.G. Hill Realty Co., 160 S.W.3d 521, 525
(Tenn. 2005) ("The parol evidence rule does not permit contracting parties to 'use
extraneous evidence to alter, vary, or qualify the plain meaning of an unambiguous written
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Moreover, holding that there is no contract when the parties do not
share an understanding of a contractual term is not a satisfactory approach to resolving all contractual disputes, because it will always advantage the party upon whom the contract imposes an obligation and disadvantage the party to whom the contract grants a right. Differences in the
interpretation of an insurance policy, for example, surely should not routinely lead to the conclusion that there is no insurance. To the contrary,
the law aims to reach the opposite result, giving the policyholder the advantage when the terms of an insurance policy are not clear. 7 Thus, false
consensus bias tends to undermine the application of the ordinary principles of contract interpretation.
Part I of this Essay briefly summarizes some of the legal principles
that govern the resolution of ambiguity in the language of contracts. Part
II discusses psychological and linguistic literature that describes circumstances in which consensus about meaning tends to dissipate. In particular, consensus about membership in a category fades when words are
used in an unusual way. For instance, everyone agrees that a table is a
piece of furniture, and a good example of furniture at that. In contrast,
some might think that a lamp is an example of furniture but not a good
example of furniture, and some might not think that a lamp is a piece of
furniture at all. Part III discusses the literature on false consensus bias,
which reveals that people tend to believe that their understanding of the
world is the predominant one and that they are therefore in agreement
with most other people. Part IV describes two experiments that use scenarios from insurance contracts to illustrate both the lack of consensus
and the presence of false consensus bias in the interpretation of contractual language among laypeople and judges alike. When asked to decide
whether a person who suffers injury from sandblasting equipment was
injured by "pollution," or whether a percussive force that causes damage
to a building constitutes damage from "earth movement," both judges
and laypeople exhibited a combination of disagreement and an exaggerated sense of how many people agreed with their responses. The experiments suggest that indeed people are not in consensus about the meanings of contractual terms in nonprototypical situations and that at the
same time they suffer from false consensus bias. Part V contains our analysis and recommendations. Among them are the suggestions thatjudges
pay more attention to the nonuniform interpretations of prior courts as
evidence of ambiguity and that appellate panels pay close attention to
disagreement among their members. We further suggest that courts apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations and the Restatement's rule
contract.'" (citation omitted) (quoting GRW Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 797 S.W.2d 606, 610
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990))).
7. The principle is called contra proferentem. For recent discussion of the rule and
why it has not been effective at eliminating ambiguous language from insurance contracts,
see Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate,
104 Mich. L. Rev. 1105, 1121-25 (2006).
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that courts must interpret a term against a party who knows of another's
different interpretation at the time of contract formation. 8 The application of these doctrines will serve to inhibit insurers from strategically using their superior knowledge acquired as repeat players to take advantage
of judges' false consensus bias. Part VI is a brief conclusion.
I.

THE LAW GOVERNING CONTRACTUAL AMBIGUITY

The overriding goal in the interpretation of contracts is to effectuate
the intent of the parties. 9 Courts repeat this goal almost as a mantra. 10
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit put it succinctly
in a recent case: "According to Michigan law, '[t]he cardinal rule in the
interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties. To
this rule all others are subordinate."' 1 1 To this end, courts rely most on
the language of the contract to determine what the parties intended, especially when the language appears unequivocal. 12 Thus, the law governing contract interpretation places a great deal of weight on plain
meaning. When the words of a contract are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, courts are likely to do more good than harm, at
least over a wide sampling of cases, if they assume that the parties underas people would ordinarily understand the constood their agreement
13
tractual language.
Problems arise when the parties disagree about the meaning of a
contract and more than one reasonable interpretation is available. Ambiguous language, as it is understood in contract law, is language that is
8. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(2).
9. See id. § 201 (1) ("Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise
or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.").
10. See, e.g., Perry v. Wolaver, 506 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Contracts should be
interpreted to give effect to the parties' intentions expressed by the writing, considering
the subject matter, purpose, and object of the contract."); French v. Assurance Co. of Am.,
448 F.3d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 2006) (" 'The principal rule in the interpretation of contracts is
to effect the intentions of the parties."' (quoting Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 732 A.2d
388, 390-91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999))); Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, 435 F.3d 431, 435 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The goal of interpreting an insurance policy,
like the goal of interpreting any other contract, is to determine the intent of the parties as
manifested by the language of the policy.").
11. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Granholm, 475 F.3d 805, 811 (6th
Cir. 2007) (quoting McIntosh v. Groomes, 198 N.W. 954, 955 (Mich. 1924)).
12. See, e.g., Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Potomac Inv. Props., Inc., 476 F.3d
231, 235 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that summaryjudgment is appropriate when "contract in
question is unambiguous or when an ambiguity can be definitively resolved by reference to
extrinsic evidence.").
13. Typical is one court's statement in In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 443 F.
Supp. 2d 703, 713 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ("[T]he primary goal of contract interpretation is to
determine and enforce the intent of the parties. To do so, the Court must turn to the
'When the parties express their intent in unambiguous
language of the contract ....
words, those words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning."' (citations omitted)
(quoting Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 320, 323
(Minn. 2003))).
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"susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation."1 4 This determination is made by the judge. Often, courts resort to the "ordinary
meaning" rule as a surrogate for what the parties likely had in mind. 1 5 As
the Second Circuit explained the rule: "In determining whether the language in a contract is ambiguous, the words must be given their 'natural
and ordinary meaning,' and the fact that the parties interpret 1 a6 provision
differently does not mean the language is per se ambiguous."
Thus, in an effort to ascertain the intent of the parties, it is up to
judges to determine not only whether language is plain or ambiguous,
but whether a particular use of a word falls within its ordinary meaning.
When the language is plain, judges typically enforce the contractual provision as written and thus as most likely intended by the majority of people and, presumably, by the parties. When there is some doubt, further
inquiry into the parties' intent is permitted, although the ordinary meaning is often used as a reasonable surrogate for such intent. If the parties
genuinely have different but reasonable understandings, a court may
hold that they never reached agreement and that, therefore, no contract
was formed. That is what happened in the famous nineteenth century
case, Raffles v. Wichelhaus,1 7 typically known as "the Peerless case." The
case involved the purchase of cotton during the American Civil War, a
time when prices were fluctuating.' 8 The contract called for the cotton
to be shipped in 1863 from Bombay to Liverpool on the Peerless. It
turned out, however, that there were two ships with that name sailing
from India to England that year, one in October, the other in
14. Mincin v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 308 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying
Colorado law); see also Dasey v. Anderson, 304 F.3d 148, 158 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying
Massachusetts law); Golden Pac. Bancorp v. F.D.I.C., 273 F.3d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 2001)
(applying New York law); Martin v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir.
2001) (applying Pennsylvania law).
15. See Spalding & Son, Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 112, 139-41 (Cl. Ct. 1991)
(interpreting "loss" in lumber contract to include destruction of trees due to forest fire,
and stating "simple and straightforward" rule of contract construction that "[w] ords are to
be given their plain and ordinary meanings" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 405 (4th Cir. 1998) (interpreting
liability coverage in fire insurance plan under strict adherence to plain meaning rule of
contract interpretation); Int'l Multifoods Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp.
2d 498, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (using "plain meaning rule" to interpret Wartime Exclusion in
insurance contract to not apply to stolen goods during peacetime); Meritxell, Ltd. v. Saliva
Diagnostic Sys., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 2759, 1998 WL 40148, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1998)
(collecting cases explaining plain meaning rule).
16. Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 446 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Conn., LLC, 791 A.2d 546, 550 (2002)).
17. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.). For recent discussion of this case in ajudicial
opinion, see, e.g., Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2000)
(describing existence of two ships as objective evidence of latent ambiguity in contract).
18. For discussion of the circumstances surrounding the case and the reason for some
of the contractual language, see generally A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to
Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, in Contracts Stories 29 (Douglas G. Baird ed.,
2007).
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December. 19 During the months between the arrival of the first and second ships Peerless, the price of cotton fell, 20 and the buyer refused to accept delivery when the cotton finally arrived on the second Peerless. The
court entered judgment for the buyer, accepting his theory that no contract was formed because the parties did not have the same transaction in
mind when they made the deal. 21 The principle of the case is still good
law, as reflected in section 201(3) of the Restatement, which states, "Except as stated in this Section, neither party is bound by the meaning attached by the other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual
22
assent."
The result of the Peerless case makes the most sense when it is relatively clear that the parties' differing interpretations were both genuine
and reasonable. It is not easy, however, to determine when this is so.
Surely, the disagreement itself cannot form the basis of such a finding.
Otherwise, parties, coached by their lawyers, would have only to say that
they disagree with the opposing party's interpretation of the contractual
language at issue to gain a litigation advantage. For this reason, courts
frequently pronounce that "' [a] contract is not rendered ambiguous sim23
ply because the parties do not agree on the meaning of its terms."
But if disagreement between the parties is not an adequate basis for
holding a contract ambiguous, what is? Judges, in determining whether
contractual language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, typically rely on their own intuitions as native English speakers.
The problem, however, is that ajudge has no way of determining whether
she is correct in her assessment that her own interpretation is widely
shared. The judge's assumption-quite reasonable in most situations-is
that people who speak the same language possess minds that are configured similarly, such that their interpretations of words in that language
would not vary widely. As Noam Chomsky puts it:
19. Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. at 375.
20. See Simpson, supra note 18, at 51.
21. Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. at 376.
22. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (3) (1981). Earlier subsections deal with
situations in which the parties were not in accord at the time the contract was formed, and
one party was aware or had reason to be aware of the other's divergent understanding. In
such cases, the unknowing party's meaning prevails. Id. § 201(2).
23. Bourke v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 159 F:3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Flora Bank & Trust v. Czyzewski, 583 N.E.2d 720, 725 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991)); see also
Evergreen Invs., LLC v. FCL Graphics, Inc., 334 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding
letter agreement for purchase of property was not ambiguous, and parol evidence rule was
not applicable when clear on face of letter that both parties agreed to transaction); Hunt
Ltd. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 889 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
contract for fee payments in freight transport agreement is not ambiguous merely because
parties later disagree); REP MCR Realty, LLC v. Lynch, 363 F. Supp. 2d 984, 1019-20
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding that use of term "voluntary" in loan agreement was not
ambiguous merely because guarantor and third party defendant attorney who advised him
disagreed on its meaning).
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It may be that when he listens to Mary speak, Peter proceeds by
assuming that she is identical to him, modulo M, some array of
modifications that he must work out. Sometimes the task is easy,
sometimes hard, sometimes hopeless. To work out M, Peter will
use any artifice available to him, though much of the process is
24
doubtless automatic and unreflective.
Whether we speak of Peter and Mary, of the parties to a litigation, or
of the judge deciding on the clarity of contractual language, we can only
assume that we are more or less normal in our understanding of language
and make adjustments for differences that come to our attention.
Willard Van Orman Quine recognized this problem when he famously
conjectured about a linguist doing field work on an unfamiliar language.
The linguist's informant, seeing a rabbit run across a field, says, "gavagai."
From this, the linguist infers that "gavagai" means "rabbit" in the unfamiliar language. However, as Quine rightly points out, "gavagai" can just as
easily refer to the parts of a rabbit or to a stage of rabbithood. The linguist really does not know:
When from the sameness of stimulus meanings of 'Gavagai' and
'Rabbit' the linguist leaps to the conclusion that a gavagai is a
whole enduring rabbit, he is just taking for granted that the native is enough like us to have a brief general term25for rabbits and
no brief general term for rabbit stages or parts.
The assumption that others understand words the way we do, then,
may not always be a valid one. In the next Part, we look at a situation in
which this assumption is predictably unsafe.
II.

THE DISSIPATION OF CONSENSUS IN NONPROTOTYPICAL SITUATIONS

Although the studies reported in this Essay examine ambiguity that is
difficult to recognize, most forms of ambiguity are easily identifiable.
Even if we do not notice alternative readings when first exposed to ambiguous language, we have little trouble recognizing the various permissible
interpretations once the ambiguity is brought to our attention. Consider
Chomsky's famous example of syntactic ambiguity, "Flying planes can be
dangerous," 26 or its variant, "Visiting relatives can be annoying." The
structure of these sentences permits us to assign two distinct interpretations, and we have little trouble recognizing them. Similarly, ambiguity

24. Noam Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind 30 (2000).
25. Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object 51-52 (1960). This is not to say that
Quine's example is of practical significance. Children learning words proceed with biases
that prefer whole objects rather than an amalgam of parts of an object. And even if Quine
is correct, there are no rabbits that are not both whole rabbits and also a set of undetached
rabbit parts, making errors in interpretation rather small. For further discussion of
Quine's example, see Gregory L. Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts 340-46 (2002).
26, Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax 21 (1965).
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of reference, as illustrated by the Peerless case, is easy enough to detect
27
once the facts come to light.
As the Peerless case also illustrates, however, when differences in understanding remain opaque for too long, they may lead to litigation. In
earlier work, Lawrence Solan has referred to undetected indeterminacy
in meaning as "pernicious ambiguity. ' 28 How pernicious the ambiguity is
depends on how difficult it is to detect it. Ambiguity of reference-the
problem in the Peerless case-is relatively transparent. If there are two
people named Bill in the room, it is easy enough to imagine a misunderstanding in which a speaker says something about one of the Bills, but a
hearer understands the comment as being about the other. Such
problems are likely to be easily discovered and resolved once they come
to light. Similarly, the parties might have disagreed about which ship
Peerless was to bring the cotton from India to England, but once the ambiguity was brought to their attention, they could not have disagreed about
the fact that both ships had the same name and that confusion could
ensue as a result.
In contrast, there are linguistic contexts in which people may simply
disagree about the range of possible meanings altogether. This often occurs when a speaker uses a word intending to express a nonprototypical
instance of a category, and the hearer does not understand the word as a
member of that category at all. Psychologists generally believe that prototypes play a role in our conceptualization of the world, although there is
disagreement about how to characterize that role. In everyday life, not
only do we decide whether something is a member of a category, but we
also recognize how well that thing fits into the category. The pioneering
work of psychologist Eleanor Rosch in the 1970s established that people
judge robins to be better examples of birds than ostriches, even though
we recognize that both are birds. Tables are good examples of furniture;
29
lamps are marginal examples at best. And so on.
The psychological reality of prototypes has led some to claim that we
conceptualize based on similarity, matching new experiences to prototypical exemplars of conceptual categories we already have and judging
whether they fit well enough to be considered members of those catego-

27. For discussion of the language issues in this case, see Sanford Schane, Language
and the Law 20-22, 33-35, 50-51 (2006).
28. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 859, 859 (2004). As acknowledged in that article, the expression "pernicious
ambiguity" comes from John Darley. See id. at 859 n.1.
29. Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104 J.
Experimental Psychol.: General 192, 197-99, 229 tbl.A1 (1975). For an overview of the
role of prototypes and categories, see generally James A. Hampton, Psychological
Representation of Concepts, in Cognitive Models of Memory 81 (Martin A. Conway ed.,
1997).
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ries.30 Others have argued-convincingly, we believe-that while it is
true that categories have prototypes, it is not true that categories are prototypes. 31 Thus, even though people judge some species of birds to be
better examples of the category than others, when asked, people do not
believe that birds is a graded category or, for that matter, that an ostrich is
any less of a bird than a more typical example. 32 Moreover, complex
concepts do not share the prototypes of their individual elements. As
Daniel Osherson and Edward Smith demonstrated, a "striped apple" may
have prototypical stripes and may be an otherwise prototypical apple, but
33
does not as a unit inherit the prototypicality of its constituent parts.
Similarly, there is no satisfactory way to derive our understanding of pet
fish from the prototypes of the constituent concepts.
The issue of how our concepts are constituted remains a subject of
research among psychologists.3 4 Many now believe that concepts contain
both definitional features that are necessary and/or sufficient for category membership and information about the concept's prototype, although, as noted, there is great debate as to the status of the latter in
35
conceptualization.
Significantly for our purposes, uncertainty in categorization goes
well beyond the recognition that some things are better examples than
others. As we stray from the prototype, we not only recognize situations
as nonprototypical, but we begin to disagree over whether the situation is
30. See Hampton, supra note 29, at 94-98 (providing overview of exemplar approach
to concept representation); see also Jesse J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and
Their Perceptual Basis 139-64 (2002) (summarizing prototype theory).
31. See, e.g., Andrew C. Connolly et al., Why Stereotypes Don't Even Make Good
Defaults, 103 Cognition 1, 2 (2007) (suggesting that categories have prototypes but are not
themselves prototypes).
32. See Sharon Lee Armstrong, Lila R. Gleitman & Henry Gleitman, What Some
Concepts Might Not Be, 13 Cognition 263, 267 (1983) (describing view of categories that
considers "[m]embership in the class [as] categorical, for all who partake of the right
properties are in virtue of that equally birds; and all who do not, are not").
33. Daniel Osherson & Edward E. Smith, On the Adequacy of Prototype Theory as a
Theory of Concepts, 9 Cognition 35, 44 (1981), reprinted in Concepts: Core Readings
261, 268 (Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence eds., 1999); see also Jerry A. Fodor, Concepts:
A Potboiler, 50 Cognition 95, 108-09 (1994) (describing how object may not assume
prototypicality of constituent parts).
34. See generally Murphy, supra note 25, for an excellent presentation of many of the
ideas and analyses.
35. See, e.g., Philip N. Johnson-Laird, The Mental Representation of the Meaning of
Words, 25 Cognition 189, 206 (1987) (suggesting that our understanding of meaning
contains both truth values and default values); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for
Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 Psychol. Bull. 3, 8-10 (1996) (arguing that mind relies on
both rule-based and associative systems of categorization); Edward E. Smith, Andrea L.
Patalano & John Jonides, Alternative Strategies of Categorization, 65 Cognition 167, 192
(1998) (promoting existence of two distinct procedures for categorization: one rule-based,
and one based on exemplar similarity); Edward E. Smith & Steven A. Sloman, SimilarityVersus Rule-Based Categorization, 22 Memory & Cognition 377, 385 (1994) (arguing that
categorization is done in two ways: by similarity and by rule).
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a member of the category at all. As the philosopher Tim Schroeder has
put it:
[I] t is a fact of life that, while most people agree about paradigmatic cases when judging kind membership, most people can
find something to disagree over regarding some non-paradigmatic cases. Are fruits a scientific kind, so that tomatoes and
squashes count as fruits? Or are they not, making tomatoes and
squashes into vegetables? Is a latte made from soymilk really a
latte, or a coffee and soy beverage? Are some sport/utility vehicles really 36light trucks, or are these classes unified only for legal
purposes?
In a set of very interesting studies, the British psychologist James
Hampton and his colleagues demonstrated the dissipation of consensus
in nonprototypical instances. 3 7 Expanding on a paradigm used by Lance
Rips, 38 they presented subjects with stories like the following:
There was a small animal with wings and feathers, and it lived on
the nectar of flowers. The animal looked and acted just like a
hummingbird. But then, [*], the animal began to change.
Eventually it ended up with transparent wings and a black and
yellow striped body, always buzzing about. It looked and acted
just like a bee. Then when it3 mated,
the offspring looked and
9
acted just like hummingbirds.
Thus, in the initial stage, the animal looked and acted like a hummingbird, and in the changed stage, the animal looked and acted like a bee.
The reason for the change, however, was varied systematically. Half the
subjects received a version in which the phrase "as a result of toxic contamination of its environment" appeared in place of the element "[*],"
while the other half received a version in which the phrase "as a result of
natural developmental processes" appeared instead. 40 Versions containing similar stories about other animal metamorphoses were also
presented, and subjects were asked various questions about
41
categorization.
Subjects did not respond uniformly. In this study, 38% of the subjects categorized the animal in accordance with its appearance, regardless
of the reason for the change. Others (28%) believed: Once a hummingbird, always a hummingbird. Still others (16%) believed that the animal
36. Tim Schroeder, A Recipe for Concept Similarity, 22 Mind & Language 68, 69
(2007).
37. James A. Hampton, Zachary Estes & Sabrina Simmons, Metamorphosis: Essence,
Appearance, and Behavior in the Categorization of Natural Kinds, 35 Memory & Cognition
1785, 1787-98 (2007).
38. Lance J. Rips, Similarity, Typicality, and Categorization, in Similarity and
Analogical Reasoning 21, 38-43 (Stella Vosniadou & Andrew Ortony eds., 1989)
(describing experiments in which subjects classified animals that had undergone change in
outward appearance).
39. Hampton et al., supra note 37, app. at 1800.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1788, app. at 1800.

1278

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1268

kept its hummingbird essence in the presence of toxins, but natural maturation into a bee-like animal made the animal a bee from beginning to
end. Still others gave inconsistent results. 4 2 When presented with categorization decisions in unusual circumstances, people may rely on such
things as outward appearances, an initial essence, or a folk-theory of maturation to make a decision. Significantly, not all people appear to rely on
the same criteria.
Linguists Linda Coleman and Paul Kay present a legally relevant illustration of this phenomenon: the concept of lying.4 3 According to
Coleman and Kay, actual falsity is only one of three elements of lying.
The others, intent to deceive and knowledge of falsity, also play substan44
tial roles in our determination of whether a statement constitutes a lie.
To test the hypothesis, they systematically varied these three factors to
create eight stories. 4 5 They hypothesized that when a story has some but
not all of the three factors that make up the prototypical lie, people will
judge the stories to contain lies nonetheless, but recognize them as atypical examples. 46 Their goal was to demonstrate that lying is not an all-ornothing category, but rather a graded one.
For example, subjects agreed that the following story contained a lie:
"Moe has eaten the cake Juliet was intending to serve company. Juliet
asks Moe, 'Did you eat the cake?' Moe says, 'No.' Did Moe lie?" 47 Subjects were asked to respond on a I to 7 scale, where a 1 indicated that the
participant was sure that Moe did not lie, a 7 indicated that the participant was sure that Moe did lie, and a 4 was the midpoint, indicating that
the participant was not sure. 48 In the case of this story, participants averaged 6.96.49 That is, everyone said that Moe lied, and everyone was sure
that his response constituted a lie.
Now consider a story in which the individual intended to deceive,
but turned out to be telling the truth after all:
Superfan has got tickets for the championship game and is very
proud of them. He shows them to his boss, who says, 'Listen,
Superfan, any day you don't come to work, you better have a
better excuse than that.' Superfan says, 'I will.' On the day of
the game Superfan calls in and says, 'I can't come to work today,
Boss, because I'm sick.' Ironically, Superfan doesn't get to go to
the game because the slight stomach ache he felt on arising
42. Id. at 1789-90 & tbl.1.
43. Linda Coleman & Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57
Language 26 (1981).
44. Id. at 28.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

30.
32-33.
31.
30 & fig.1.
33 tbl.2.
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turns out to be ptomaine poisoning. So Superfan was really sick
when he said he was. Did Superfan lie?50
When asked whether Superfan had lied, the mean response was 4.61, a
lie, but not too far from the midpoint of 4.51 And consider a story in
which the speaker intended to deceive, but told the literal truth, in a
52
Clintonesque manner:
John and Mary have recently started going together. Valentino
is Mary's ex-boyfriend. One evening John asks Mary, 'Have you
seen Valentino this week?' Mary answers, 'Valentino's been sick
with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.' Valentino has in
fact been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, but it
is also the case that Mary
had a date with Valentino the night
53
before. Did Mary lie?
Here, the mean was 3.48, again near the midpoint, this time just on the
54
truthful side.
But mean scores do not tell the whole story. Although the means
were near the midpoint, it was not the case that just about everyone
judged the case as uncertain. While all sixty-seven participants considered Moe to be a liar (scoring his statement as a 5, 6, or 7), there was no
consensus about Superfan: 57% said he lied, 31% said he did not lie, and
12% could not decide. 55 Similarly, while 63% of participants did not believe that Mary lied to John about Valentino, it was still the case that 27%
56
thought she did lie, and 10% could not decide.
What this means is that when people look at nonprototypical situations that have only some of the elements of what is typically called a lie,
their judgments are not only less certain, but they are not in agreement.
Some elements of a concept, an actual falsehood in the case of lying, may
be necessary conditions for some people but not for others. It is only in
nonparadigmatic cases that this variation arises because in the most typical uses of the term, all of the elements are present, thus producing consensus about category membership.
This absence of consensus in nonprototypical cases can have serious
legal ramifications, say, in a perjury prosecution. Jurors would not only
have to find the facts and apply the law, but would also have to reach
decisions based on conceptual judgments about which they may not be in
agreement.
50. Id. at 31-32.
51. Id. at 33 tbl.2.
52. Lawrence Solan and Peter Tiersma discuss such examples in the context of the
Clinton impeachment. See Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M. Tiersma, Speaking of Crime:
The Language of Criminal Justice 231-33 (2005) (arguing that different conceptions of
lying may explain why people sincerely disagreed over whether Clinton lied about his
sexual relations).
53. Coleman & Kay, supra note 43, at 31.
54. Id. at 33 tbl.2.
55. See id. at 39 tbl.5.
56. See id.
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III. FALSE CONSENSUS BIAS
A. OverreportingConsensus
False consensus bias is the phenomenon by which people often believe that their beliefs are more universally accepted than they actually
are. Pauline Kael of The New Yorker inadvertently exhibited the phenomenon observed in modern cognitive bias research when she wondered how
Richard Nixon could have won the 1972 election since "[n] o one I know
voted for Nixon. '57 Studies of false consensus bias in the last two decades
have attempted, through experimentation, to capture the rate at which
people overestimate their conformity with societal norms in various
contexts.
Early studies in the 1930s showed that those who disregarded rules
believed that others did so as well. In a study published by Daniel Katz
and Floyd Henry Allport in 1931, students who reported that they had
cheated on tests were more likely to believe that others also cheated, and
the more of their own cheating they acknowledged, the more cheating
they ascribed to other students. 58 For example, 69.9% of the students
admitted having cheated at least once. 59 Yet while only 8% of those
claiming never to have cheated believed that four-fifths or all of the student body cheated, the four-fifths or greater estimates were accepted by
60
47.7% of those who admitted cheating freely.
Katz and Allport thus found that those students who acknowledged
cheating extensively were more likely to believe that others cheated as
well. However, the paradigm they used suffers from a design problem
that the authors candidly acknowledged: It depends on participants accurately reporting their behavior. 6 1 If some cheaters falsely report that they
are not cheaters, then the study can overestimate the extent to which
62
people falsely attribute their own conduct and views to other people.
Other studies have avoided this pitfall by asking individuals to answer
a wider range of questions and by focusing on more "neutral" subject
57. David Harsanyi, False American Idols, FrontPage Magazine, Oct. 21, 2002, at
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=FB13CB3C-8C10-4312-99CEEE8AF05AOBBO (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (recounting Kael's reaction to
Nixon's landslide presidential victory over George McGovern in 1972 when she supposedly
said, "How can that be? No one I know voted for Nixon.").
58. See Daniel Katz & Floyd Henry Allport, Students' Attitudes: A Report of the
Syracuse University Reaction Study 227-29 (1931).
59. Id. at 210 tbl.LVIII.
60. Id. at 227 tbl.LXIV.
61. Katz and Allport aptly recognized this limitation in their study and attempted to
minimize the level of misreporting through various measures, such as using anonymous
reporting, requiring check rather than handwritten responses, and providing assurances
that there would be no disciplinary consequences to participants. See id. at 208-09.
62. If, for example, 40% of participants say they cheat and estimate that 75% of others
cheat, the result appears to be false consensus bias. But if, because of underreporting,
75% actually cheat, then there is accurate estimation rather than false consensus bias at
work.
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matter. Lee Ross, David Greene, and Pamela House, for example, asked
college students to categorize themselves one way or the other according
to thirty-four variables, including personal traits (e.g., shy, optimistic,
competitive), personal preferences (e.g., brown or white bread, being
alone or with others, Italian or French movies), and other categories of
preference and expectation. 63 Participants were also asked to estimate
the percentage of college students who would categorize themselves one
way or the other. 6 4 In thirty-two of the thirty-four categories, the participants exhibited bias toward the category in which they had placed themselves. 65 For instance, participants who preferred brown bread to white
bread estimated that 52% of college students in general would share that
that only
preference, while those who preferred white bread estimated
66
37.4% of college students would prefer brown bread.
Similarly, in a 1993 study, Joachim Krueger and Russell Clement
presented college students with forty statements from a comprehensive
personality test, the revised Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI-2), and asked them not only to fill out the study, but also to report their beliefs as to how many people would report the same answers
to each survey question. 67 The MMPI-2 survey consisted of self-descriptive phrases, such as, "I sweat very easily even on cold days," and "I am a
very sociable person. '68 Subjects were asked whether they "agreed" or
"disagreed" with each description. 69 The Krueger and Clement study
found that in every instance where survey subjects reported that they
"agreed" with the MMPI-2 statement, they predicted more consensus
70
than did those who "disagreed" with the statement.
Krueger and Clement also found that even when they informed subjects of the false consensus bias phenomenon, these subjects nonetheless
returned responses that reflected the bias as well. 71 That is, they found
that education about false consensus bias had no statistically significant
depreciative effect on the subjects' estimates of consensus, demonstrating
the "robustness" of the consensus bias. 7 2 They called this type of false
63. Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, The "False Consensus Effect": An
Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13J. Experimental Soc.
Psychol. 279, 285-88 & tbl.3 (1977).
64. Id. at 286.
65. Id. Ross, Greene, and House reported that "subjects who placed themselves in a
given descriptive category consistently estimated the percentage of 'college students in
general' in that category to be greater than did subjects who placed themselves in the
alternative category." Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 287 tbl.3.
67. Krueger & Clement, supra note 1, at 598-99.
68. Id. at
69. Id. at
70. Id. at
71. Id. at

600 tbl.1.
598.
599.
598-601.

72. Id. at 599, 601.
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consensus bias "truly false consensus" because subjects exhibited it even
73
when warned of the phenomenon.
While researchers continue to investigate the sources of false consensus bias and the circumstances in which it is most likely to occur, 7 4 the
fact that the bias exists is well documented. In the next section, we see
how the robust nature of false consensus bias combines with the dissipation of consensus about category membership to create difficult interpretive problems for decisionmakers charged with resolving disputes over
contractual terms.
B. Indeterminacy, False Consensus Bias, and Contract Interpretation
Susceptibility to false consensus bias places judges engaged in the
interpretation of contractual language at risk of erroneous decisionmaking. As discussed earlier, when deciding whether to employ principles of
interpretation to resolve contract disputes, judges must decide whether
or not the disputed language is ambiguous. In order to do so, the judge
must determine whether reasonable people differ as to the meaning of
the debated term. If a judge is reasonably certain that a term can only
have one meaning, or that the meaning that one party assigns to the term
represents the intention of both parties at formation, then the judge is
not likely to look outside the language of the contract. As we have seen,
however, people differ in their judgments when asked whether a nonprototypical situation fits into a category, and false consensus bias can
cause individuals to fail to appreciate that others see the world differently
than they do.
Disputes over the language in insurance contracts provide good data
for studying the extent of this phenomenon. For one thing, insurance
policies contain a great deal of standardized language that has led to litigation and thus make it possible to investigate whether there is language
thatjudges tend to interpret nonuniformly. For another, when litigation
over the terms in an insurance contract ensues, the issue is often the legal
status of a nonprototypical situation. In this circumstance, false consensus bias may produce legally anomalous results. Not only are insurance
policies subject to the parol evidence rule, but they are also subject to the
doctrine of contra proferentum, which calls for ambiguities in insurance

73. See id. at 596-97.
74. See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich, Differential Construal and the False Consensus Effect,
59 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 623, 632-33 (1990) (arguing that false consensus bias is
most prevalent when there is opportunity to construe single situation in different ways with
no information that others may construe situation differently); James A. Kitts, Egocentric
Bias or Information Management? Selective Disclosure and the Social Roots of Norm
Misperception, 66 Soc. Psychol. Q. 222, 234 (2003) (arguing that false consensus bias
results from bias in samples of information exchanged rather than from intrinsic cognitive
bias).
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policies to be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. 75
Thus, the preliminary determination of ambiguity is an important one.
The cases yield one of three outcomes: (1) the contractual term unambiguously applies to the facts; (2) the contractual term unambiguously
does not apply to the facts; or (3) the parties are legitimately engaged in a
dispute over an ambiguous term.
To take an example that will be the subject of our experiments discussed in the next Part, courts disagree about whether fumes that travel
within a single building should be considered "pollution" for purposes of
interpreting insurance policy clauses that exclude coverage for damage
or injury caused by pollution. Courts that recently examined this problem have come to opposite conclusions. 7 6 One court, for example, held
that the pollution exclusion clause applied "clearly and unambiguously"
to "fumes emanating from [an] epoxy/euratane sealant" dispersed within
the plaintiff's place of business. 77 In contrast, another court refused to
apply the exclusion clause where "solvent fumes . . . drifted a short distance from the area of ... intended use and ... caused inhalation injuries." Instead, it found the exclusion clause to be ambiguous and de78
clared that ambiguities "must be construed against the insurer."
One approach is for courts to consider seriously the absence of consensus among other courts deciding similar cases. But courts are in disagreement over how much attention to pay to their own disagreements.
Consider Park-Ohio Industries v. Home Indemnity Co., in which the question
was whether fumes from a leaking furnace that permeate a building
should be considered "pollution" under a clause excluding pollution injuries in an insurance policy. 79 The plaintiff raised the absence of uniformity among judges to bolster the argument that the policy was ambiguous, and therefore, should be construed in favor of the insured under the

75. See, e.g., Wood v. Foremost Ins. Co., 477 F.3d 1027, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007) ("When
interpreting an insurance policy, Missouri courts follow the principle of contra
proferentem, and construe any ambiguity against the insurer.").
76. Compare Ad. Ave. Assocs. v. Cent. Solutions, Inc., 24 P.3d 188, 192 (Kan. Ct. App.
2001) (finding pollution exclusion to be unambiguous and to cover damages caused from
leak of cement cleaner), and Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 76 P.3d 773, 775-76
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (finding pollution exclusion applied to personal injuries of building
occupant caused by release of fumes during insured roofing contractor's application of
waterproofing sealant), with State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. M.L.T. Constr. Co., 849 So. 2d
762, 770-71 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (finding mold damage not covered by pollution exclusion
as exclusion limited to traditional polluters), and Belt Painting Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 795
N.E.2d 15, 18-21 (N.Y. 2003) (finding pollution exclusion ambiguous and inapplicable to
paint fumes inhaled by contractor).
77. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Wash., D.C. v. Kline & Son Cement Repair, 474 F. Supp. 2d
779, 790 (E.D. Va. 2007).
78. Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Breyter, 830 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting
Belt Painting,795 N.E.2d at 20).
79. 975 F.2d 1215, 1216-18 (6th Cir. 1992).
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doctrine of contra proferentem. 8 0 An Ohio court had long ago held that
such disagreement constituted evidence of ambiguity:
Where the language of a clause used in an insurance contract is
such that courts of numerous jurisdictions have found it necessary to construe it and in such construction have arrived at conflicting conclusions as to the correct meaning, intent, and effect
thereof, the question whether such clause is ambiguous ceases
to be an open one.8 '
But the Sixth Circuit in Park-Ohio took the opposite approach, arguing
that the court had an obligation to make its own independent judgment
of ambiguity. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the insurance
company, the court said:
If we were to accept plaintiffs' argument that a contract provision is ambiguous as a matter of law because other jurisdictions
have chosen to apply a provision differently, then we would be
rejecting a well-settled Ohio rule of construction to apply the
plain language8 2of the contract where that language is clear and
unambiguous.
Using a somewhat different argument but reaching the same conclusion, a federal district court in Kansas recognized in Judd Ranch, Inc. v.
Glaser Trucking Service, Inc. that courts in different jurisdictions used dif83
ferent interpretive principles to construe pollution exclusion clauses.
The Kansas court nonetheless found such a clause to be clear. 8 4 That
case involved a claim by Judd Ranch, a cattle ranch company, against
Glaser Trucking and Glaser's insurer for delivering cattle feed containing
metal fragments. Judd Ranch alleged that Glaser had negligently failed
to clean the delivery trucks properly after a previous delivery of scrap
metal. 85 The case was before the court on a summary judgment motion
by the insurer, which claimed that the pollution exclusion clause in
Glaser's insurance policy exempted it from liability for the damage done
to the cattle. 86 The policy defined pollution as "any solid, liquid, gaseous
or thermal irritant or contaminant. '8 7 Applying this definition to the
scrap metal ingested by the cattle, the court held the language to be
unambiguous. 88
Yet, as the court recognized, other states had reached a contrary result by interpreting pollution exclusion clauses not according to the
broad definitions contained in the insurance policies, but rather as
80.
81.
1934).
82.
83.

Id. at 1219-20.
Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Gerwick, 197 N.E. 923, 925 (Ohio Ct. App.
Park-Ohio, 975 F.2d at 1220 (emphasis omitted).
No. 06-1245-WEB, 2007 WL 1520905, at *6 (D. Kan. May 22, 2007).

84. Id. at *6-*7.

85. Id. at *1-*2.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *2.
88. Id. at *5.
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"terms of art," and thus had found them to be ambiguous.8 9 In American
States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois
agreed with other courts that had held definitions of pollution to be so
broad as to have "potentially limitless application" and thus limited the
exclusion to the "ordinary" sense of pollution-namely, to "only those
hazards traditionally associated with environmental pollution." 90
The court in Judd Ranch rejected this "ordinary meaning" approach, 91 opting instead for the definitional approach that allowed for a
broader interpretation of the exclusion. Moreover, it was bound by the
decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court, which had earlier relied on
broad definitions contained in the policies, in finding the term unambiguous.92 Because of its reliance on these earlier cases, the Kansas court
never reached the question of whether disagreement among courts in
other circumstances might itself provide evidence of ambiguity.
Thus, as evidenced by the foregoing discussion, courts are not uniform in how they perceive disagreement about meaning. The studies reported in the next Part suggest that courts should pay closer attention
when they are made aware of the absence of consensus about the meanings of contractual terms.

IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE: FALSE CONSENSUS BIAS IN
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

In this Part, we describe two experimental studies designed to test,
first, whether people are in agreement about the applicability of contractual terms in a nonprototypical situation, and second, whether false consensus bias gives them an inflated sense of the degree to which their understanding is "ordinary." Study 1 (described in Part IV.A) examines the
responses of laypeople; Study 2 (described in Part 1V.B) examines the
responses of judges. Both studies reveal disagreement among participants as to whether a term fits into a category contained in the contractual language and an exaggerated sense of the typicality of the participants' responses.
We chose as the basis of our studies two different terms that appear
on standard insurance contracts and that are frequently the subject of
litigation: "pollution" and "earth movement." We have just seen how
courts are inconsistent in their treatment of pollution exclusions in insurance contracts. Courts are similarly inconsistent in their treatment of
other terms that are the subject of insurance exclusions, including earth
movement, the prototype of which is a mudslide. 9 3 One set of scenarios
89. See id. at *6 (discussing cases).
90. 687 N.E.2d 72, 79 (Ill. 1997).
91. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for discussion of courts' uses of the
"ordinary meaning" approach.
92. Judd Ranch, 2007 WL 1520905, at *6-*7.
93. Compare Wyatt v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co. of Seattle, 304 F. Supp. 781, 783-84 (D. Minn.
1969) (finding that earth movement exclusion did not apply to damage caused by third
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created for the studies was based on cases that ask whether the onset of
silicosis (a respiratory disease caused by inhaling silica dust) as a result of
exposure to sand in the course of sandblasting is an injury caused by pollution. 9 4 The other was based on cases that address the question of
whether damage to property resulting from a concussive force generated
from nearby blasting constitutes property damage caused by earth
95
movement.
A. Study 1: Laypeople as Subjects
1. Experimental Materials and Procedure. - The study consisted of two
different hypothetical scenarios: one involving pollution, the other involving earth movement. In each, a claimant is injured in an event that
would entitle him or her to recovery. Each story then proceeds with one
of two versions. In one, the policyholder has insurance that might cover
the damages that would have to be paid, but the insurance policy contains an exclusion for pollution or earth movement, respectively (we refer
to this as the "exclusion version"). In the other version, the policyholder
has special coverage that would include injury caused by pollution or
earth movement, respectively (we refer to this as the "insurance version").
The use of these two versions controlled for result-oriented responses reflecting a possible bias against either insurance companies or plaintiffs.
We presented each subject with one of the four scenarios. In addition, in a pilot study, we presented subjects with prototypical situations, as
"catch trials." The catch trials were divided into two scenarios, one of
which described an accident uncontroversially caused by pollution; the
other, an accident clearly not caused by pollution. The purpose of the
catch trials was to determine whether participants were paying attention
to the materials. The results indicated that participants were, indeed,
paying attention to the task. Ninety-two percent answered the questions
correctly. The catch trial scenarios are presented in the Appendix. The
experimental scenarios are presented below.
POLLUTION SCENARIO

San-o-Sand, Inc. sells sand for use in sandblasters and other
sandblasting equipment. A number of workers at San-o-Sand all
party's excavation of contiguous property adjacent to plaintiff's home), with Loretto-Utica
Props. Corp. v. Douglas Co., 642 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that earth
movement exclusion applied to prevent insured from recovering for damage to building
caused by frost heave).
94. Compare Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 647-48 (Ct.
App. 2005) (finding pollution exclusion clause applied to preclude silica dust inhalation
claim against insurer), with Andrew Robinson Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No.
030353, 2006 WL 1537382, at * 10-*11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2006) (finding injury from
sandblasting caused by neighbor's negligence not within pollution exclusion).
95. See supra note 93 and accompanying text for cases interpreting earth movement
exclusion clauses.
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have recently developed the same very serious infection of the
lungs, called silicosis. Silicosis is caused from the inhalation of a
bacteria found in contaminated beach sand. [96] As part of their
job, San-o-Sand employees test sandblasters in a special facility.
The workers wear masks and other protective equipment during
the testing, but particles of sand remain in the air when the testing is done. When the workers remove their protective equipment they inhale large amounts of sand. Samples of this sand
have tested positive for the bacteria that causes silicosis.
Exclusion Version: Derek, one of the San-o-Sand workers injured, sued San-o-Sand and won. San-o-Sand, in turn, has now
filed a claim with its insurance company, Pacific All-Risk, to repay San-o-Sand for the damages it has to pay to Derek. There is
an exception in the Pacific All-Risk policy for injuries caused by
pollution. If the bacteria in the sand inhaled by the San-o-Sand
workers is found to be a pollutant, Pacific All-Risk will not have
to pay on the claim. Pacific All-Risk is claiming that the contaminated sand falls under the pollution exception to the policy.
Insurance Version: Derek, one of the San-o-Sand workers injured, sued San-o-Sand and won. San-o-Sand, in turn, has now
filed a claim with its insurance company, Pacific All-Risk, to repay San-o-Sand for the damages it has to pay to its workers, including Derek. San-o-Sand has purchased a protection plan for
injuries caused by pollution. If the bacteria in the sand inhaled
by the San-o-Sand workers is found to be a pollutant, Pacific AllRisk will have to pay on the claim under the special policy
addition.
EARTH MOVEMENT SCENARIO

Jim and Cindy Walsh own a home on a fifteen acre property
in the Purple Mountains. The property adjacent to theirs is a ski
lodge called Majestic Slopes. Majestic Slopes is expanding and
plans to build a new ski lodge. The ground they picked for the
new lodge was not level, and Majestic had to blast the rugged
area in order to have a flat surface upon which to build the
foundation of their new construction. Majestic hired special explosive engineers to set off a small, concentrated amount of dynamite on the grounds, approximately one quarter mile from
the Walshes' home. The explosion was more powerful than the
engineers expected, however. The blast caused a serious underground concussion. The tremors in the surrounding area shook
the foundation and walls of the Walsh house. As a result, it sustained serious structural damage.
Exclusion Version: The Walshes sued Majestic Slopes to recover money to repair their home and won. Majestic Slopes
filed a claim with its insurance company, Mountain All-Risk.
Majestic's insurance plan contains an exclusion for loss "caused
96. For purposes of the study, we simplified the process by which silicosis develops.
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by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any earth
movement, including, but not limited to earth sinking, rising, or
shifting." If the damage to the Walsh house was caused by earth
movement, Mountain All-Risk does not have to pay the claim.
Insurance Version: The Walshes sued Majestic Slopes to recover money to repair their home and won. Majestic Slopes
filed a claim with its insurance company, Mountain All-Risk.
Majestic purchased a protection plan from Mountain for loss
"caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any
earth movement, including, but not limited to earth sinking, rising, or shifting." If the damage to the Walsh house was caused
by earth movement, Mountain All-Risk will have to pay under
the special protection plan.
QUESTIONNAIRE

For all four scenarios, subjects were asked the same four questions:
1. Do you think that the damage was caused by [pollution/
earth movement]? [For this question, subjects could answer
"Yes," "No," or "Can't Decide."]
2. You are one of 100 people who have volunteered to answer these questions. How many of the 100 do you think will
agree with your answer to question one?
3. How confident are you in your answer to question one?
[Subjects here could choose from "Not at all Confident,"
"Slightly Confident," "Moderately Confident," "Very Confident,"
or "Totally Confident."]
4. A complaint has been filed with the Commissioner of
Insurance, complaining that [Pacific/Mountain] All-Risk was
wrong in denying this claim. If the Commissioner concludes
that All-Risk acted in bad faith, he can impose a fine of up to
$100,000. How much of a fine should the Commissioner impose on [Pacific/Mountain] All-Risk? [Subjects answering this
question could choose one of seven ranges of damage amounts:
"Zero," "Small fine (up to $10,000)," "Moderate fine
($40,000-$60,000)," "Moderately large fine ($60,000-$90,000),"
"Large fine ($91,000-$99,000)," or "Maximum fine
($100,000)

."97]

As noted, each subject received a single scenario. We gathered subjects from a concession stand line in a busy park. Subjects were told that,
in exchange for their anonymous participation in the study, a two dollar
97. The results from this question suggest that many participants simply were not able
to translate their answers to the earlier questions into dollar amounts in any principled
way-a finding consistent with empirical work on jury assessment of punitive damages. See
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide 212 (2002) ("The present
empirical studies ... show that the major locus of unreliability and disorder in punitive
damages decisions is in jurors' assessments of an appropriate dollar award . . . ."). We do

not discuss this question further, in that it falls outside the scope of this Essay.
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donation would be made to a charity. 98 The four scenarios were
presented at random to 120 individuals, with 30 people receiving each
version.
2. Results and Discussion.
a. The Pollution Scenario. - There was no evidence in our data that
people respond differently to the scenario depending on whether saying
"yes" meant triggering insurance or excluding insurance. For example,
fourteen of the thirty participants who responded to the insurance version answered "yes" when that answer meant that the insurance company
would have to pay, and thirteen of the thirty participants who responded
to the exclusion version answered "yes" when that answer meant that the
insurance company would not have to pay. Similarly, the different versions did not produce a significant difference in subjects' estimated percentages of agreement by other subjects. This in turn suggests, consistent
with the literature on false consensus bias discussed in Part 11, that
whatever false consensus bias effect we find is not limited to individuals
with a particular result-oriented agenda. Because there was no significant
difference between the two versions, we combined the two groups of
thirty subjects for further analysis. These combined results are presented
in Table 1. The columns in Table 1 refer to the actual number of subjects giving each response (the "Number" column), the percentage that
each number represents out of the sixty total responses (the "Actual Percentage" column), and the mean percentage of participants that subjects
believed would agree with their own responses (the "Mean Estimated
Percentage").
TABLE 1:

Do

YOU THINK THE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY POLLUTION?

How

MANY PEOPLE OUT OF 100 DO YOU THINK WILL AGREE WITH YOUR ANSWER?

Yes
No
Can't Decide

Actual

Mean Estimated

Number

Percentage

Percentage

27
25
8

45.0
41.7
13.3

60.5
63.4
38.4

For each pollution subject, we calculated her "error," namely, the percentage of subjects that she believed agreed with her minus the percentage of subjects who actually agreed with her. The mean of these numbers
was 19.4 (with a standard deviation of 22.4), which is significantly different from zero by the Wilcoxon test (p < .001).

99

Note that whatever the

98. We have made the donation, both on their behalf and on behalf of those who
participated in a pilot study.
99. The Wilcoxon test is a statistical procedure used to compare the means of two
populations that are not in a normal distribution. This study's result is statistically
significant. Typically, psychological studies demand only that p < .05 to reach significance.
Our study was significant at the level of p < .001. The null hypothesis tested by the
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answer ("yes," "no," "can't decide"), there was false consensus bias. People believed that their understanding of the story was significantly more
common than was the reality.
In addition, participants were generally moderately to very confident
in their answers to question one as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2: How

CONFIDENT ARE YOU IN YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION ONE?

Confidence

Number

Not At All
Slightly
Moderately
Very
Totally

1
5
29
17
8

This finding suggests that not only do subjects overestimate the extent to
which other participants understand the term the same way they do, but
they are less likely to discover the extent to which there is disagreement,
since they are comfortable with their own interpretations.
b. The Earth Movement Scenario. - The results for the earth movement scenarios were very similar to those for the pollution scenarios.
Again, it made no difference whether answering "yes" triggered the insurance company's obligation to pay, or whether it triggered the application
of the exclusion that absolved the insurance company from paying. For
example, eleven out of the thirty participants who responded to the insurance version said that there was earth movement when that would mean
that the insurer had to pay, and thirteen out of the thirty participants
who responded to the exclusion version said that there was earth movement when that would mean that the insurer did not have to pay. Once
again there was no significant difference between the groups in their estimates of agreement by other subjects. Consequently, the two groups
were combined for further analysis. The responses of these combined
groups are presented below in Table 3.
3: Do YOU THINK THE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED
How MANY PEOPLE OUT OF 100 DO YOU THINK

TABLE

BY EARTH MOVEMENT?
WILL AGREE WITH

YOUR ANSWER?

Yes
No
Can't Decide

Number

Actual
Percentage

Mean Estimated
Percentage

24
24
12

40
40
20

67.4
63.1
36.5

Wilcoxon test was that the mean error is zero. The likelihood of that hypothesis being
valid given the distribution of data is less than one in one thousand, according to the test.
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As before, for each earth movement subject, we calculated her "error,"
namely, the percentage of subjects that she believed agreed with her minus the percentage of subjects who actually agreed with her. The mean
of these numbers was 23.5 (with a standard deviation of 20.7), significantly different from zero by the Wilcoxon test (p < .001). Once again,
all three of the possible responses showed false consensus bias, with the
differences between the actual and estimated percentages of agreement
statistically significant for each of the three responses.
Subjects typically were moderately to very confident in their answers.
The distribution of confidence levels is presented below in Table 4.
TA LE

4: How

CONFIDENT ARE YOU IN YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION ONE?

Confidence

Number

Not At All
Slightly
Moderately
Very
Totally

2
6
22
22
9

The goal of this study was to determine whether, when faced with
nonprototypical scenarios, people (1) are in disagreement with one another, and (2) overestimate the extent to which their response is the predominant one. The results answer both of these questions affirmatively.
Moreover, subjects were relatively confident in their answers to question
one, whatever the scenario and whatever their answer.
B. Study 2: Judges as Subjects
1. Experimental Materials and Procedure. - In Study 2, we presented
sixty-four state and federal judges attending a conference for judges with
the same stories used in Study 1. However, we used only the version in
which a "yes" answer meant that insurance would be excluded (the "exclusion version"). 10 0 The questions posed to the judges were identical to
those in Study 1, except that we asked the judges about their agreement
with both laypeople and other judges, as follows:
2. One hundred laypeople have volunteered to answer these
questions. How many of the 100 do you think will agree with
your answer to question one?
3. One hundred judges have volunteered to answer these questions. How many of the 100 do you think will agree with your
answer to question one?
100. Reducing the number of experimental conditions permits stronger statistical
inferences when the number of subjects is limited. Since there was no statistical difference
between the "exclusion" and "insurance" versions in Study 1, we decided to use only the
"exclusion" version in Study 2. That is the version that actually appears in the insurance
policies that are the subject of litigation.
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Like Study 1, each subject received a single scenario at random. Roughly
half received the pollution scenario, and roughly half received the earth
movement scenario.
2. Results and Discussion.
a. The Pollution Scenario. - Thirty-three judges answered questions
connected with the pollution scenario. Judges were far more uniform in
their responses than were laypeople. Only four judges answered "yes" to
question one, indicating that most judges believed that the insurance
company should have to pay. Nonetheless, the results suggest thatjudges
are also subject to false consensus bias. Table 5 shows the judges' answers
to question one and question three, asking whether pollution caused the
damage and how many judges were believed to be in agreement.
TABLE

5: Do

YOU THINK THE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY POLLUTION?

How

MANY JUDGES OUT OF 100 DO YOU THINK WILL AGREE WITH YOUR ANSWER?

Yes
No
Can't Decide

Number

Actual
Percentage

Mean Estimated
Percentage (of
judges in
consensus)

4
20
9

12.1
60.6
27.3

69.5
68.8
77.2

We calculated each judge's "error" by subtracting the percentage of
judges who actually agreed with her from her estimate of this agreement.
The mean of these numbers was 25.88 (with a standard deviation of
26.19), significantly different from zero by the Wilcoxon test (p < .001).
Judges also overestimated the number of laypeople with whom they
were in consensus. Table 6 below shows the difference in the percentage
of laypeople who agreed with the judges (taken from Study 1) versus the
judges' estimates of their consensus with laypeople.
TABLE

6:

ONE HUNDRED LAYPEOPLE HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO ANSWER

THESE QUESTIONS.

How

MANY OF THE 100 DO YOU THINK WILL AGREE

WITH YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION ONE?

Yes
No
Can't Decide

Actual
Percentage

Mean Estimated
Percentage

45
41.6
13.3

73.8
50.3
43.3

As we did before, for each judge we subtracted the percentage of laypeople who agreed with herjudgment from the judge's estimate of this per-

2008]

1293

FALSE CONSENSUS BIAS

centage. The mean discrepancy was 16.9 (with a standard deviation of
22.6), significant by the Wilcoxon test (p < .001).
We also asked judges how confident they were that their answers to
question one were correct. Judges were, for the most part, either moderately or very confident in their answers.
TABLE

7: How

CONFIDENT ARE YOU IN YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION ONE?

Confidence

Number

Not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Very
Totally

3
1
13
10
5

b. The Earth Movement Scenario. - The remaining thirty-one judges
answered questions after reading the earth movement scenario. As in the
pollution scenario, most judges answered "no" to the first question
(whether the damage was caused by earth movement) and estimated that
they would be in consensus with other colleagues at a rate of about 75%,
regardless of their answers to question one. Therefore, the judges who
answered "no" to question one were correct in estimating that approximately 70% ofjudges would agree with them. The judges who answered
"yes" or "can't decide," in contrast, substantially overestimated their
agreement with otherjudges. The table below shows the judges' answers,
along with the actual and estimated percentages of consensus among
other judges.
8: Do YOU THINK THE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED
How MANY JUDGES OUT OF 100 DO YOU THINK

TABLE

BY EARTH MOVEMENT?
WILL AGREE WITH

YOUR ANSWER?

Yes
No
Can't Decide

Number

Actual
Percentage

Mean Estimated
Percentage (of
judges in
consensus)

7
22
2

22.6
71.0
6.5

71
72.5
79

Once again, we calculated each judge's "error" by subtracting the percentage ofjudges who actually agreed with her from her own estimate of
this agreement. The mean difference between estimated percent agreement and actual percent agreement was 15.03 (with a standard deviation
of 28.3), significant by the Wilcoxon test (p < .001).
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In addition, judges again overestimated their agreement with laypeople. Table 9 below shows the difference between the actual agreement
between laypeople and judges and the judges' estimated agreement between the two groups.
TABLE

9:

ONE HUNDRED LAYPEOPLE HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO ANSWER

THESE QUESTIONS.

How

MANY OF THE 100 DO YOU THINK WILL AGREE

WITH YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION ONE?

Yes
No
Can't Decide

Actual
Percentage

Mean Estimated
Percentage

40
40
20

71.9
60.9
16.5

For each judge, we calculated her "lay error," namely, her estimate of the
percentage of laypeople who agree with her minus the percentage of lay
subjects who actually agreed with her. The mean of these numbers was
21.8 (with a standard deviation of 19.3), which is significantly different
from zero by the Wilcoxon test (p < .001).
Judges were also asked here to report how confident they were in
deciding whether or not earth movement caused the damage in the scenario. Table 10, below, shows that judges' confidence in their answers
was consistent with the confidence of both laypeople and with the judges
who read the pollution scenario.
TABLE

10: How

CONFIDENT ARE YOU IN YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION ONE?

Confidence

Number

Not at all
Slightly
Moderately
Very
Totally

2
4
13
10
7

V.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study raises potentially serious issues. If both judges and laypeople predictably understand legal terms differently from each other and
fail to recognize thatfact, then the legal system may be producing erroneous
results. Parties might be prone to enter into agreements not knowing
that they do not understand the terms the same way, and judges, because
of false consensus bias, will not always recognize the legitimacy of the
differences in understanding between the parties. Thus, a judge may
consider language to be plain when in fact different people do not understand it the same way, and this may happen even when the judge's understanding is shared only by a minority of people in general. The result
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may be a failure to consider extrinsic evidence because of an improper
application of the parol evidence rule, a failure to apply contra proferentum, a mistaken ruling about the plain or ordinary meaning of the contractual terms, or any combination of these misapplications of operative
legal principles.
Much insurance litigation involves events that may be seen either as
nonprototypical instances of categories contained in the contract, or alternatively, as noninstances of those categories.1 0 ' A study of the parol
evidence rule cases in two jurisdictions has shown similar results. 10 2 Disputes over the application of the parol evidence rule most often concern
how well the words of a contract fit a set of events that have occurred in
the world.
Obviously, we cannot predict how often this happens, but there is
some reason for optimism. As discussed earlier, these problems arise as a
consequence of the dissipation of consensus when people use words to
describe nonparadigmatic situations. 03 But by definition, the paradigmatic situations are those about which the contract was written to address. Thus, most of the time, the recurrent situations that brought
about the contractual language in the first place will be handled without
significant controversy. A contract that excludes coverage for "earth
movement" applies by its plain language to earthquakes and mudslides.
By the same token, many situations uncontroversially have nothing to do
with earth movement, and no one would think that they do. The same
holds true for pollution exclusion clauses.
The results in the survey of judges (Study 2) confirm these conclusions by showing that in nonprototypical or hard cases, judges tend to
come to the same conclusions as otherjudges. Butjudges themselves are
susceptible to false consensus bias when they assume that their interpretations represent the general consensus among other judges and laypeople.
If we understand ambiguity to include disagreements among people
about whether language applies to the situation at hand, then false consensus bias among judges presents a problem: It indicates that the first
question that judges must ask before applying principles of interpretation-whether the disputed language is ambiguous-may not be answered correctly in many cases. Given the results of our Study 2, it should
not be surprising that judges in different jurisdictions, examining very
similar contractual language, arrive at opposite results.
For the judges who answered that they "can't decide" whether pollution or earth movement caused the damage in the scenario (13.3% and
6.5% of the judges, respectively), false consensus bias is harmless to the
101. For examples in the context of asbestos litigation, see Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of
Dispute, 12 Conn. Ins. LJ. 349, 393-406 (2006).
102. Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct,
77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 87, 103 (2001).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
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extent that such an understanding is good enough to cause the judge to
hold the language ambiguous as a legal matter. For the most part,
though, false consensus bias, whether among parties or judges, compromises rule of law values when it occurs and is not rooted out by the
system at some point in the legal process. In the scenarios studied here,
judges who understood there to be pollution or earth movement were
very susceptible to false consensus bias. For example, while only 22.6% of
the judges said "yes" to whether the damage was caused by earth movement, those same judges believed, on average, that 71% of judges asked
this question would be in agreement with them. And while they were
actually in agreement with 40% of our lay subjects, they believed that they
would be in agreement with 71.9% of laypeople. The results of the scenarios involving pollution are similar. Judges with these views may rule that
the plain language of the policy, or at least its ordinary meaning, must
result in a ruling in favor of the insurance company when in fact the
language is far from plain.
False consensus bias may further explain one reason why parties in
disputes appear to be so intransigent. The problem is exacerbated, to the
extent that our study is indicative, by the fact that the consensus bias effect was so strong that people who were actually in agreement with a minority of other participants typically believed that they were in about a 60
to 70% majority. 10 4 Given the preponderance of the evidence standard
for the burden of proof in civil litigation, this effect may well be strong
enough to convince parties to continue to litigate their position when in
fact their own interpretation accords with less than half of people who
interpret the same language.
There are several ways for courts to combat the propensity to engage
in false consensus bias. First, our study suggests that judges should take
far more seriously disagreement among courts, and at times, between parties. The very fact that different disinterested decisionmakers do not look
at the same language the same way should provide evidence that some
kind of conceptual problem is present. Judges should be made aware
that consensus really does dissipate when we leave the prototype, and that
predictable cognitive variation can explain the differences among
10 5
judges.
104. See, e.g., supra Table 1 (showing laypeople in 45% and 41.7% minority
estimated consensus by, respectively, 60.5% and 63.4% of other laypeople) and supra
Table 3 (40% and 40%, estimated respectively as 67.4% and 63.1%).
105. This is not to say that cognitive preference explains all differences among judges
in interpreting legal texts. When more than one interpretation is possible, no doubt
politics plays at least some role in determining which judges prefer which interpretation.
See ThomasJ. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 826 (2006) (demonstrating that liberal
judges defer more to liberal agency interpretations of statutes, and that conservative judges
defer more to conservative agency interpretations). Nonetheless, judges operate within a
range of legitimate interpretations, and they should recognize this fact in deciding
whether contractual language is ambiguous.
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Second, at the very least, judges sitting on appellate panels should
take seriously disagreements among themselves in their initial understanding of language as possible evidence that there is no single understanding of a term in dispute. Appellate panels permit judges to discuss
and resolve their differences. Differences in interpretation among judges
sitting on the same panel should be taken seriously as evidence that the
understandings of the parties may be in legitimate disagreement, even
when each of the judges is confident that the language is clear. Our studies suggest that the disagreement itself is more probative of ambiguity
than is ajudge's confidence (or lack thereof) in any particular interpretation, especially when judges are equally confident of interpretations that
are mutually inconsistent.
Finally, courts should be aware of the significant advantage that false
consensus bias gives to repeat players in contractual relations and correct
for it. Insurance company drafters, based on experience with prior litigation, can take advantage of their superior knowledge by writing policies
with broad language. The policyholders, in contrast, are not likely to
think in advance of the wide range of situations in which the company
will later attempt to have exclusions apply.10 6 Furthermore, insurers can
(and do) accomplish this goal more effectively by writing definitions into
the policies that make it harder for judges to construe these policies more
narrowly. 107
The results reported here suggest that courts should be more aggresin
using such principles as interpreting insurance policies consistent
sive
with the reasonable interpretation of the insured, 10 8 analyzing insurance
106. For discussion of the advantages of repeat players in contractual relations, see
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L.
Rev. 821, 887-92 (1992).
107. See, e.g., Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Advance Terrazzo & Tile Co., 462 F.3d 1002, 1009
(8th Cir. 2006) (finding absolute pollution exclusion as defined in policy precluded
coverage); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Kline & Son Cement Repair, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 779,
796-97 (E.D. Va. 2007) (granting summary judgment in favor of insurer in pollution
exclusion case based on broad definitions in policy).
108. See, e.g., Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1106, 1116
(9th Cir. 2006) ("'[A] court that is faced with an argument for coverage based on
assertedly ambiguous policy language must first attempt to determine whether coverage is
consistent with the insured's objectively reasonable expectations."' (quoting Bank of the
W. v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992))). For discussion, see Kenneth S.
Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 59, 61-67
(1998) (describing scope of reasonable expectations "doctrine," but arguing that
reasonable expectations "principle" underlying doctrine informs much of insurance law);
Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1151, 1152-54 (1981)
(summarizing judicial development of reasonable expectations doctrine); see also W.
David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive Contracting
by Standard Form, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 853, 877-80 (proposing reasonable expectations
doctrine be replaced with stronger doctrine regulating exercise of discretionary drafting
power); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
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policies for substantive defects that may lead to market failures, 10 9 and
resolving ambiguities against the party that has attempted in advance to
take advantage of the other party's differing understanding.' 10 If insurers wish to exclude nonprototypical instances of events that many would
not think of as coming within the exclusion, they should do so clearly by
making these scenarios and their exclusion especially salient in the
contract.1 11
For example, insurers know from experience the kinds of scenarios
that routinely lead to disputes over the scope of pollution exclusion
clauses. Policyholders, in contrast, are not likely to have any experience
with such questions as what should count as "pollution" if an unforeseen
injury occurs. In such cases, insurers should be required to make salient,
perhaps through the use of examples, the fact that they are using such
terminology in an especially broad manner that might include some
things that people would not ordinarily consider to be pollution. This
would place more of the risk of false consensus bias on insurers, who are
in a position to write policies that focus the policyholder's attention on
language that is likely to lead to disagreement about coverage. Insurance
companies frequently make decisions that involve shifting risks to the
party in the best position to avoid harm.1 12 This Essay suggests that they
should act similarly with respect to their own role in creating interpretive
environments in which courts may find clarity in favor of the insurers
where serious disagreements actually exist.
CONCLUSION

Our studies strongly suggest that both laypeople and judges are subject to false consensus bias in deciding whether nonprototypical situations fit within contractual language. This should not be surprising, since
the underlying psychological literature suggests that both the dissipation
of consensus and false consensus bias are robust phenomena. We have
made specific recommendations for how the legal system might reduce
the rate of error that emanates from the exaggeration of the "normalcy"
of one's interpretation of a contract.
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 23 (1984) (defining reasonable
expectations of parties from whatever source as new meaning of contracts).
109. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1389, 1435-59 (2007) (arguing that courts
should apply products liability law in analyzing insurance policies for design defects or
failures to warn consumers of pitfalls).
110. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981).
111. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1279-83 (2003) (proposing that courts provide
presumptive validity to salient contract terms in unconscionability determinations).
112. For recent discussion of this role in the context of corporate directors' and
officers' liability insurance, see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74
U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 533-34 (2007).
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The phenomena discussed in this Essay in all likelihood occur in circumstances far broader than the insurance contracts we discuss. For example, the appellate reporters contain many opinions in which judges
are in disagreement over the application of statutory language. Principles such as the rule of lenity, which tells courts to resolve ambiguous
language in penal statutes in favor of criminal defendants, also rely upon
an initial determination of whether language is ambiguous.1 13 It would
not be the least bit surprising to learn that false consensus bias colors
judicial decisions in statutory cases as well as in contractual cases. We
therefore caution judges to take seriously the positions of other judges in
these cases as well, as reflected both in earlier decisions and in the interactions among judges sitting on appellate panels. We also hope to have
motivated additional, theoretically-driven empirical research into the interpretation of both contracts and statutes.

113. For discussion of some of the interpretive issues in such cases, see Lawrence M.
Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 57, 62-75 (1998).
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CATCH TRIALS

UNAMBIGUOUSLY POLLUTION

Bill Taylor owns and operates a uranium mill on a 1.4
square mile site in Springfield. The site contains an active alkaline processing mill and two waste disposal ponds. The mill operates by extracting crude uranium oxide from uranium ore for
sale to nuclear power plants. As part of this milling process, a
large residue of liquid sludge is piped into the waste disposal
ponds. This sludge contains a mixture of radioactive and
nonradioactive, but still toxic, materials.
Fifteen years after the opening of the plant, residents of
nearby Capital City all began to experience similar illnesses.
The Capital City public health office and local doctors determined that the sicknesses were caused by the liquid sludge that
had been disposed of by the Taylor mill, and that seeped into
their drinking water.
The residents sued and won. Bill Taylor filed a claim with
his insurance company, Pacific All-Risk, for the amount of the
judgment against him. The Pacific All-Risk insurance policy
contains an exclusion for damage caused by "pollution in the
environment." If the toxic sludge seeping from the lake into the
Capital City drinking water is considered pollution, Pacific
All-Risk does not have to pay Bill Taylor's claim. Pacific All-Risk
does refuse to pay the claim, citing the pollution exclusion.
UNAMBIGUOUSLY NOT POLLUTION

Donna Martin owns a dress shop called "Now Wear This"
on Melrose Avenue in Beverly Hills, California. During the busy
holiday season, Donna's store was packed with shoppers. One
of those shoppers accidentally spilled her Orange Mocha
Frappuccino across the doorway of the store on her way out.
Before anyone had a chance to clean up the spill, another customer, Sydney Andrews, walked in. Immediately, she slipped on
the spilled coffee, fell, and broke her leg in three places.
Sydney sued Donna for damages resulting from her injury
and won. Donna filed a claim with her insurance company,
Pacific All-Risk. Pacific All-Risk has an exclusion in their policy
for injuries caused by "pollution in the environment." If the
Orange Mocha Frappuccino is considered pollution, Pacific
All-Risk does not have to pay Donna Martin's claim. Pacific
All-Risk does refuse to pay, citing the exclusion.

